The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 56 | Number 1

February 1989

Volunteering Children for Medical Experiments
Albert DiIanni

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
DiIanni, Albert (1989) "Volunteering Children for Medical Experiments," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 56: No. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol56/iss1/7

Article 7

Volunteering Children for
Medical Experiments
Albert Dilanni, S.M.

Father Dilanni is vicar general of the Marist Fathers in Rome. He
received his doctorate from the University of Louvain. Belgium. has
taught moral philosophy and medical ethics. and has published widely.
A subject which has aroused considerable interest on the part of
moralists is the legitimacy of proxy-consent by parents or guardians in
non-therapeutic experimentation on children. By "non-therapeutic" is
meant experimentation aimed at benefitting not the child itself, but other
children.' Two major positions have crystallized. These positions are I) an
absolutist one forbidding proxy-consent for non-therapeutic experiments
on children in all cases (Ramsey, May), and 2) a moderate position
allowing such consent on two conditions: if there is no discernible risk to
the health of the child, and if there present at the same time the hope of
significant benefit to others (McCormick, Curran, O'Donnell). I am in
sympathy with the conclusion of the second group but do not agree with
the arguments they adduce to support it. The argument offered by its
principal exponent, Richard McCormick, seems especially questionable
and will be treated extensively below.
1. Abortion and the Ethics of Medical Experimentation

The Supreme Court's 1973 decision liberalizing abortion has
complicated questions of medical experimentation. Some doctors have
interpreted it as implicitly sanctioning a wide range of research on
abortuses or on fetuses destined for abortion. The argument runs: "If you
are allowed in a certain instance to kill a fetus (by aborting it), then a
fortiori are you allowed to perform upon it less damaging experiments in
view of potential benefit to others?" Among the experiments which these
doctors would avoid in the abortion situation are those which would tend
to keep the fetus alive, since that would be contrary to the wishes of the
parent(s). They only type of experiment allowed would be one which
would benefit not the subject of the experiment but only others.
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According to Paul Ramsey this skews longstanding principles of
medical ethics regulating experimentation. 2 These principles have always
required the experimenter to procure explicit and informed consent from a
patient prior to engaging in a well-designed medical experiment upon that
patient. Only when the state of the patient renders this impossible might
one proceed to act upon a validly presumed consent. However, such
presumed consent was restricted to those cases in which the experiment
was the last therapeutic hope for the patient himself. The classical instance
is called the "Good Samaritan" case. Here, since coma or other factors
preclude explicit consent, a doctor may legitimately presume that the
subject would consent to treatment indicated for his own benefit and
would thus agree to experimental medicine if all other means were deemed
futile.
Allowing non-therapeutic fetal experiments on those about to be
aborted , while forbidding therapeutic experiments on them, transposes
the traditional principles of experimentation. It legitimizes experimentation on an individual for the benefit of others and forbids it in the only
cases where traditionally it was most clearly allowed , i.e., when the
experiment is aimed at the benefit of the subject him/ herself. We must take
care that this skewed logic as regards fetuses marked for abortion does not
also generate a lax attitude in experiments on children who, like fetuses,
have not fully developed their essential human potential.
2. Experimentation on Children: Different Opinions
In this paper, we will set aside the abortion question and concentrate on
the moral principles which should govern experimental research on very
young children who are considered by the vast majority to be persons
morally and legally.3
Since such children are incapable of formal consent, questions arise
concerning whether and when parents may give proxy-consent for medical
experiments to be performed upon them. Paul Ramsey hews to a strict
line: proxy-consent is legitimate only when the experiment is the last hope
for the child's own recovery.4 It is permissible, in other words, only when
the child itself is ill and the experiment clearly provides the last possible
hope of cure for the child-subject of the experiment. Ramsey qualifies this
rule by allowing experiments upon a child, even though it is not itself ill, if
it lives in an area in which an infectious children's disease actually rages as
an epidemic. He cites the first inoculations of children with the Salk
vaccine as a legitimate "exception" to the general rule. Even though there
was a small risk that the vaccine itself might cause polio, in those years all
children were at risk each summer from the raging poliomyelitis epidemic.
Ramsey deems that the presence of this danger was sufficient to allow one
to construe such experimental inoculations as "therapeutic" in a wide
sense.
The Guidelines for Clinical Investigation adopted by the American
Medical Association in 1966, took a broader view of the legitimacy of
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parental proxy-consent and allowed it in some cases of non-therapeutic
experiment. They set forth two conditions, both of which must be fulfilled
together before a construction of presumed consent in the child could be
permitted. Such experimentation is sanctioned I) "only if the nature of the
investigation is such that mentally competent adults would not be suitable
subjects" and 2) only "under circumstances in which an informed and
prudent adult would reasonably be expected to volunteer himself or his
child as a subject". The first condition envisages experiments necessary for
research on the mentally retarded or in the case of diseases which do not
primarily affect adults, but children. The second condition restricts nontherapeutic experiments to those cases wherein the risks foreseen are
minimal or negligible. The first condition is rather objective and follows
the indications of medical science. The second begets the further question
of how to determine what would reasonably move an adult to volunteer
himself or his / her child.
Ramsey claims that the AMA criteria beg a more basic question:
whether one can ever proceed to presume consent in the case of young
children. He argues that to presume the consent of a child is to treat the
child not as a child but as an adult. The presumption is necessarily "false"
since the child in fact does not have, nor ever had, an actual or habitual
capacity to give or hold back consent. 5 William May agrees with Ramsey
and adds that the legitimacy of therapeutic experimentation on children is
grounded not on a presumption of the child's consent, but on the parents'
duty in charity to care for their children. 6
Ramsey continues that even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that
proxy-consent be allowed in the case of children, it must be interpreted
with utter strictness. This derives from the analogy with adults. Few adults
would agree to the proposition that if they were unconscious they could
become the subject of experiments for the benefit of others, even when
such experiments entailed no discernible risk, but involved only "offensive
touchings". (Examples ofthese are taking a blood sample or performing a
small transfusion.) Why then, argues Ramsey, would one deem it
legitimate to volunteer our children in similar instances? The issue of
non-therapeutic experimentation on children is prismatic, Ramsey
continues, for it tests the seriousness with which we view the consent
requirement in general.
I respect the care and reverence of the Ramsey-May approach, but I
believe that paradoxically it may be at once overly cautious and potentially
dangerous. In the first place Ramsey's position denying the possibility of
any presumption of consent on the part of a child establishes too strong a
distinction between children and ad ults, a difference which will come back
to haunt the conservative moralist in the abortion issue and in questions
regarding defective newborns. It is morally safer and closer to the truth to
construe both children and fetuses as full-fledged humans on the grounds
that they share the same essential potentialities. As such .they can be
presumed also to share the same basic desires as adult humans. The fact
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that they are not as yet subjects of actual or habitual choice does not seem
relevant. If, because of these esssential potencies, they share the same
rights as adults in the medical situation, then why not the same
responsibilities in relevantly similar cases?
Moreover, May's attempt to derive our moral obligation to give consent
for therapeutic experiments for the benefit of the child from the duty of
charity incumbent upon parents seems, in itself, to demand a construction
of the child's desires by way of analogy with the desires of adults. We
usually decide the demands of charity by asking ourselves what we would
desire others to do for us in the same situation. It is done by consulting our
own ordinary desires. In deciding whether it is an act of love to let a badly
malformed infant die in certain circumstances, we imagine ourselves in the
child's place and ask what we ourselves would want others to do for us.
And this is to construct consent in the child.
Other Catholic moralists agree with Ramsey in insisting on explicit
informed consent from a competent adult patient in the case of nontherapeutic experimental research . But in such cases some would allow the
next of kin to give proxy-consent on behalf of an incompetent adult or
child if such experiment involved only minimal risk or minor discomfort to
the patient (McCormick, Curran, O'Donnell). McCormick is the principal
exponent of this view and I will analyze his arguments as representative .7
3. Analysis and Critique of McCormick's Position
He begins by noting that as years passed, the strictness of the
Nuremburg Code has gradually been moderated. This code demanded
that the explicit consent of the subject was absolutely necessary and went
on to underline that this meant that "the person involved should have a
legal capacity to give consent".8 As evidence of a relaxation he cites the
1966 AMA guidelines and the 1973 HEW document entitled Protection of
Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures. 9 The latter forbids nontherapeutic experiments which are risky, but approves of non-therapeutic
experiments on the basis of proxy-consent when there is "little risk and
where the potential benefit is clear". It further specifies that the
information to be gained must be unobtainable in other ways and that the
potential benefit to mankind must be significant and far outweigh the risk.
McCormick agrees with the practical conclusions of these studies and
himself allows proxy-consent where there is no discernible risk or undue
discomfort in a non-therapeutic experiment. 1O He defends these
conclusions in two steps. He first analyzes the moral meaning of proxyconsent in the therapeutic situation where all agree that it is allowed. He
then applies the principles derived from this analysis to experimentation
on the child in the non-therapeutic situation. Though I can readily agree
with his conclusions, I cannot subscribe to the reasons he advances in their
defense. And I believe that this disagreement is important because often in
ethics, reasons for conclusions are more interesting than conclusions
themselves, for if they are unsound they may, through logical extension,
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contaminate even other areas of moral consideration.
McCormick argues that the reason why we can legitimately presume
that an adult would decide in favor of experimentation which will be
potentially therapeutic for himself is because he ought morally to do so. In
other words, from the accepted proposition that one ought morally to try
to save one's own life in most situations, we can conclude to the
proposition that a person would want to do so in those same situations.
McCormick then applies this thought to the non-therapeutic instance.
He says that if we can discern that an incompetent adult or child ought
morally to allow a non-therapeutic experiment to be performed on
him j herself when there is no discernible risk, then we can presume that
that person would want to consent to such an experiment.
Against Ramsey's contention that to impute moral obligation upon the
child is to falsely imply that it is a moral agent, McCormick replies that the
use of ought-language need not be construed as implying either actual
moral obligations or agency. I I It is simply a device or construction used to
ascertain the reasonableness of our expectations and intentions. To apply
such ought-language, he claims, is simply a way of pointing to the sociality
inherent in all humans, a sociality shared by adults and children alike. If we
say of an adult that he ought morally to supply certain benefits for others
when this involves no discernible risk, we are not implicitly saying that
they are moral agents possessing free will, but simply implying that they
are social beings and that the quality of sociality bears certain moral
responsibilities. Though a child does not share agency and free will, it does
share this essential sociality. It may not be able to consciously experience
this sociality or respond to its claims but we may do so for him, to the
extent that it is reasonable.
Here I believe that McCormick is correct: the ought language as used in
his argument need not be read as treating the child as an adult who has
actual desires and freedom to choose. However, even though McCormick's
argument does not offend from that point of view, I will argue that his
approach of determining what a person wants by first establishing oughts,
and on the basis of this presuming consent, is untenable in general,
whether it be applied to adults or to children.
McCormick's argument can be schematized as follows:
- What A ought morally to do, A would (ceteris paribus) want to do.
-But A ought morally to do x.
-Therefore, A would (ceteris paribus), want to do x.

It is clear from his discussion that in speaking of wants in the first
premises, McCormick is interpreting them to mean inclinations inherent
in the essence of man as a social being. With Aquinas and other naturalla w
theorists, he views these deep-seated wants (inclinations) as the ground of
certain values, which values in turn ground certain moral "oughts".12
These moral oughts are prescriptive re-writings ofthese deep-seated wants
or inclinations; they are simply these wants presented in another form.
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Natural law theory defends the existence of certain imperatives which all
humans ought to embrace, because these imperatives are ultimately
definitive of their own well-being, because they express in different words
what each human being at the deepest level of his essence really desires.
Moral oughts give voice to what humans most deeply want.
For McCormick, the reason why we can proceed to presume the consent
of incompetent adults or children to be experimented on in therapeutic
situations is because we know that they ought to choose to have welldesigned experiments to be performed on them when these are the last
hope for saving their life. We can know what they would want in such
instances because we know that there is a strong moral imperative or
"ought" for all humans to try to preserve their life. Similarly, one can
presume that an incompetent adult or child would consent even to nontherapeutic experimentation when this does not entail a discernible risk or
undue discomfort and at the same time affords significant benefit to
others. Being a possessor of a social nature, this is what he / she ought to do,
therefore it can be presumed that he / she would also want to do it.
This reasoning is not only unnecessarily complicated but, to my mind,
also fallacious. For McCormick's syllogism, if I have correctly construed
it, appears to equivocate. It uses the word "want" in two different senses: to
refer to essential inclinations in one mention (first premise) and to actual
desires, or the presumption of such in the second mention (conclusion).
But it is clear that these are two different realities or concepts, as we will
show. The argument trades on the verbal similarity which exists between
deep-seated wants and actual wants or willings and, as a result, commits
what in logic is called the "fallacy offour terms". It tries invalidly to ded uce
the presumption of an actual willing from a proposition announcing the
presence of essential wants or inclinations which are revealed by a moral
ought.
But the ded uction of actual willings, or of the presumption thereof, from
our essential inclinations, is contrary to our moral experience and offends
our comon moral understanding. Can one really determine what one
would actually want in a situation from a perception of what one ought to
do? Is it not as often the case that people do not desire to do what they
ought? In other words, do not the actual desires of people or their decisions
often conflict with what they are essentially inclined to, with their deepest
wants? Is this not the very meaning of sinfulness? To point to a deep-seated
want which all humans share is not, by the same token, to ascertain that
this is what individual humans would actually want. Actual willings are
often in disharmony with deep-seated wants. 13
4. Presentation and Defense of the Present Author's Position
It seems to me that if we can presume consent on the part of a child for
an experiment benefitting himself, as all seem to allow, it is on much
simpler grounds than McCormick's considerations of essential inclinations and oughts. It is because self-preservation, statistically speaking, is
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what the great majority of people desire most of the time. And it is this
empirically verifiable behavioral constant which provides a simple and
legitimate basis for a prediction offuture activity and for a construction of
a presumption of consent.
The same can be said for the case of the non-therapeutic experiment. It is
a fact open to observation that most people act altruistically when an
action seems important for the benefit of others and it involves minimal
risk or discomfort to oneself. It is because empirical observation reveals
the presence of this minimum of altruism in people of most ages and
cultures that we can presume that an unconscious adult would, if
conscious, decide, ceteris paribus, to undergo a mild experiment which
gives promise of substantial benefit to his fellow humans. The same form
of reasoning can be applied to the child in similar circumstances. The child
is, after all, a human being and it can be presumed that it will have the same
desires as other humans in terms of self-preservation and altruism . In sum,
we know that people would want to act out of altruism to this minimal
extent, not because we know that they morally ought to do so, but because
by experience we know that they do constantly so act.
The attempt to move from moral oughts to what one would want tries to
shed light upon a murky area from a source which is even murkier. Moral
obligations are notoriously unclear, highly debated , and themselves call
for justification. On the other hand, actual performances of people and a
reading of their usual preferences is a much more straightforward and
accessible matter.
We must keep in mind , too, Marx's lesson that the morality of a society
tends to mirror the interests of the power elite. In our society, it is clear
from the moral acceptance of feticide that the ideal of pluralism upon
which our country was founded has been narrowed to exclude the fetus
and its presumed desires. The regnant morality of the adult population,
which is clearly the power-elite in respect to children and the unborn, has
already exploited the unborn for its own interests - interests which are, at
times, admittedly quite important, but also for "interests on demand". In
such a libertarian moral climate, it is dangerous to try to derive
conclusions regarding the volunteering of children from so-called
"objective" moral premises. It is far safer to ask the members of the power
group to consult their own desires and ask how they themselves would
actually like to be handled by society in various experimental situations
and from this, to presume the same desire in children.
My approach is safer because it reduces the legitimacy of experimentation to cases in which the common run of people would actually be
willing to volunteer themselves. It is the lowest common denominator
approach which goes along with what the general run of people would
allow. It thus avoids an escalation of the presumption upon children to the
heroic or supererogatory. It avoids, too, McCormick's later propulsion of
the obligation to volunteer for non-therapeutic experiments into the realm
of social justice. 14 To call it an obligation in justice seems excessive. This
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can lead to an extrapolation of human sociality into higher and higher
realms of obligation. The moral index of entering upon non-therapeutic
experiment can, at most, be construed as a call upon one's altruism and
charity. Consent for such experimentation can be presumed in children
only to the extent to which such a degree of charity actually extends in the
general population. The burden of the proof is with those who want to
extend it further.
One question remains. If we allow, with McCormick, that a child can be
presumed to undergo non-therapeutic experiments when there is no
discernible risk, what shall we count as the absence of such a risk? Are even
so~called "offensive touchings", mentioned above, off-limits as Ramsey
contends? (Ramsey allows only such insignificant interventions as a buccal
smear, weighings and the like). I think the answer to this once again lies in a
statistical study. Questionnaires can be developed to ascertain what sorts
of interventions adults would be willing to allow done upon themselves if
they were in the "child" situation. These same types of things can then be
presumed to be wanted also by the child in relevantly similar situations.
This may seem too individualistic an approach to McCormick, if I am to
judge from some of his later remarks in response to criticisms by Ramsey.IS
The question of the individual vs . society is always a delicate one in
morality. It can not be decided in general and once and for all. One may
have to shift emphasis from one side to the other of the scale depending on
the subject matter at issue and the climate opinion in a culture. In the
context presently under discussion, where we are dealing with defenseless
and voiceless children, and in a climate which is utilitarian and anti-child
as is our own, we would do best to lean toward favoring the individual. We
are living in a technological society which has a bias toward the powerful,
toward adults in full-fledged maturity, toward control, and toward the
pre-eminence of conscious, experienced life. As Ralph Potter, the Harvard
theologian, has insisted in speaking of abortion, the situation of our
culture is such that we must take the safer path. We must not ask for whom
the bell tolls. It tolls for all of us and for our children.
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